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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CARL A. P ALOl\IBI, ~ 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
Case No. 
vs. 
( 11284 
D & C BUILDERS, ) 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
Respondent accepts Appellant's statement. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
On October 24, 1966, plaintiff filed a complaint 
in the District Court of 'Veber County against defend-
ant for damages to plaintiff's residence resulting from 
ddendant's installation of aluminum siding to the ex-
terior walls of said residence in an unworkmanlike, 
1 
unskillful and careless manner. The complaint also 
alleged that defendant's installation of said siding was 
stopped by order of Ogden City because defendant 
had willfully failed to obtain an Ogden City building 
permit. The final allegation of the complaint was an 
assertion that defendant had wrongfully caused a lien 
to be filed against the residence of plaintiff, thereby 
slandering plaintiff's title to his residence. The recovery 
sought was $1,000.00 in actual damages and $5,000.00 
as exemplary damages. 
An answer, counterclaim and third-party complaint, 
inter-pleading plaintiff's wife, VIOLA PALOMBI, 
were duly entered by defendant. The counterclaim 
sought recovery of the contract price, attorney fees 
and a foreclosure of defendant's purported lien. The 
four allegations of the counterclaim were ( 1) that there 
was a written contract between plaintiff and defendant, 
(2) that defendant had made full performance of said 
contract, ( 3) that none of the contract price had been 
paid by plaintiff, and (4) that defendant's lien had 
been filed "within eighty days of the furnishing of the 
last work or material." Written interrogatories were 
propounded by plaintiff and answered by defendant. 
The Honorable PARLEY E. NORSETH tried the 
case without a jury and entered judgment in favor of 
the plaintiff and against the defendant in the sum of 
$627.00 as general damages, $1,000.00 as exemplary 
damages, $250.00 as attorneys' fee and $42.00 as reim· 
bursement for the costs of plaintiff. 
2 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmation of the trial court 
decision. 
STATEl\IENT OF :FACTS 
On or about April 23, 1966, two sales representa-
tives of the Appellant called upon Respondent at his 
residence for the purpose of selling aluminum siding. 
Their solicitation or inducement for a contract included 
representations that Respondent's residence would be 
"a show house" to be shown on television, that a dis-
count was possible and that the workmanship would be 
"A No. l." (Tr. p. 4, lines 14-29 and p. 34, lines 11-14) 
A printed form contract, prepared by Appellant (Plain-
tiff's Exhibit A), was subsequently signed by Respond-
ent and his wife. 
Appellant's workmen commenced the application 
of the aluminum siding to Respondent's residence on 
April 26, 1966. (Tr. p. 14, lines 7-9 and p. 34, lines 
25-28) 
Respondent was very dissatisfied with the poor 
quality of Appellant's work and telephoned to Appel-
lant's Salt Lake Office on April 25, May 2, and May 
.1, 1966, to communicate to Appellant his dissatisfaction 
with the workmanship. (Tr. p. 6, lines 8-26; p. 143, 
linPs 3-16; Plaintiff's Exhibit 0) Failing to get any 
response from Appellant, Respondent called the Ogden 
City Building Inspector, who issued a "Stop 'Vork" 
3 
order against Appellant on May 6, 1966, for Appellant' 
failure to obtain an Ogden City building permit. (Tr 
p. 7, lines 14-22 and Plaintiff's Exhibit B) On May i 
1966, Respondent ordered Appellant's workmen of 
his premises and they complied by removing all of theli 
materials, including firring strips and siding. (Tr. p 
105, lines 1-14; p. 7, lines 5-9; p. 22, lines 1-26; am 
6. 23, lines 4-21) No additional work was done at Re 
spondent' s residence by Appellant's workmen, nor wen 
any additional materials delivered to said residenc1 
after Saturday, May 7, 1966; (Tr. p. 35, lines 1-17. 
p. 145, lines 3-30; p. 146, lines 1-7; and p. 152, line 
1-25) although Appellant requested permission o: 
Respondent to finish the job on two or three occasiorn 
(Tr. p. 18, lines 18-30; p. 21, lines 15-30; and p. 13j 
lines 16-24) 
J. F. FERRIN, an aluminum siding contractor 
and RAY L. HANSEN, the Utah State Buildin1 
Inspector and formerly an aluminum siding contractor 
testified to the substandard and poor workmanshir 
inherent in Appellant's application of siding to Re 
spondent's residence. (Tr. p. 43, lines 14-30; p. 44, line 
1-8; p. 48, lines 23-28; and p. 55-58) In the sarni 
testimony MR. HAN SEN alluded to the unnecessar1 
damage caused to Respondent's residence by Appellant\ 
use of improper materials. CARLISLE BA WDE~ 
an employee of Appellant, testified to part of the darn 
age caused by Appellant's workmen. (Tr. p. 127, lint· 
8-16) The general damages were described most clear!; 
by Respondent during his cross examination by Appel 
4 
]ant's counsel. (Tr. p. 18, lines 2~-30; and p. 19, lines 
1-11) 
Appellant's office manager, DA\' ID A. NABOR, 
testified that he didn't obtain a building permit until 
May 24, 1966. (Tr. p. 132, lines 16-22) It should be 
noted that this building permit was not obtained until 
nearly one month after the actual work had commenced. 
MR. NABOR's testimony and his answers to the 
interrogatories propounded by Respondent confiicted 
with the testimony of llesnon<lent and .l\IRS. PAL-. ... 
OMBI; however, J\,1R. NABOR did admit that his 
testimony was untrue in at least one instance. (Tr. 
p. 146, lines 1-25). 
On August 10, 1966, Appellant caused a mechanic's 
lien to be filed against Respondent's residence. The 
filing date of said lien was ninety-six days after Appel-
lant had furnished the last work and materials (:May 
6, 1966) and ninety-five days after Respondent had 
ordered Appellant's workmen off the premises (l\1ay 
7, 196). (Tr. p. 105, lines 1-14; and p. 146, lines 5-7) 
It was averred in said lien that Appellant had done 
its last work on May 24, 1966, although the workman 
of Appellant testified that May 6, 1966, was the last 
clay any work was performed. (Tr. p. 148, 3-13; and 
p. 14, lines 1-8) 
5 
POINT I p 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR I! ti 
FINDING THE LIEN OF THE DEFENDAN'J P 
AND APPELLANT TO BE INVALID. 
The Respondent submits that a mechanic's lie 18 
recorded 95 days after the last work and material 11 
were furnished and also 95 days after the workmen hai P 
been ordered away from the premises by the owne I 
is invalid under Section 38-1-7, Utah Code Annotate~ ) 
1953. p 
C1 
Although the contract in the instant case was nu 2 
completed by Appellant prior to the lien filed on Augrn 
10, 1966, it was definitely rejected and abandoned b~ 
Respondent at least 95 days prior to said filing. Ir n 
fact Appellant's workman, CARLISLE BAWDEN e 
testified that Respondent had ordered Appellant'! c 
l workmen off the premises on May 7, 1966, with th1• 
~ following language: 
c 
You fellows get off here right now. I don· r 
want any more work done. If you don't get oft 
I will call the law on you. (Tr. p. 105, lines 7-9 v 
This absolute rejection of the contract and its perform 
ance by Appellant was reaffirmed at least once b: 
t 
( 
Respondent prior to May 24, 1966, when he refuser, 
to permit MR. LYLE JENSEN, one of Appellant'- c 
workmen, to resume work. (Tr. p. 136, lines 1-15 
and p. 155, lines 3-28) These assertions and acts 01 
Respondent were the testimony of Appellant's owr \ 
witnesses and render untenable the statement in Ap 
6 
pdlant's Brief, page 5, that May 24, 1966, was the first 
I! tirne Appellant learned of Respondent's refusal "Lo 
lN'i permit the work to go on." 
It is generally held that abandonment of a contract 
lie is equivalent to completion for purposes of filing a 
rial mechanic's lien, or construed as a constructive com-
hai plction. Annot., 64 A.L.R. 276, 277 ( 1930) ; Stark-
,vne Davis Co. v. ·Fellows, 129 Or. 281, 277 P. 110, 64 
tte~ A.L.R. 271 (1929). l\iany cases have supported the 
principle that niere cessation of labor will not of itself 
constitute an abandonment. See 64 A.L.R. 276, at 
nu f 286, n. 29. 
grn 
l b~ These cases establishing the doctrine of abandon-
. Ir ment as the equivalent of constructive completion 
E~' enumerate the following elements of the doctrine: ( 1) 
mt'! cessation of work, ( 2) intention to abandon the con-
thi lract, and ( 3) fair notice to potential lien claimants. 
Not only are all of these elements present in the instant 
case, but one additional element is present-an absolute 
lon' oft rejeetion of the contract by the owner which rejection 
7_9 was communicated unequivocally to several represen-
tatives of Appellant, the only potential lien claimant. 
>flll 
(Tr. p. 105, lines 7-9; and p. 155, lines 3-28) 
b: 
Jser. In the instant case Appellant's off ice manager 
mt'- claimed that picking up the building permit on I\Iay 
-15 ~4, 1906, was "when the last bit of work was done for 
; or the home." (P. 148, lines 9-13 and 24-30) Also, it 
~n1rr \\as implied that picking up the materials allegedly left 
Ap at Hespornlenf s residence on or after May 24, 1966, 
7 
was additional work extending the potential time fr T 
filing a mechanic's lien. (Tr. p. 154, lines 7-20) Neitht (l 
the picking up of the building permit nor the allege w: 
picking up of surplus materials from Responden! b~ 
residence extended the statutory time for filing ar 
mechanic's lien. District Heights Apartments v. Nt ar 
land Co., 202 :J\!Id. 43, 95 A.2d 90, 39 A.L.R. 2d 3i to 
(1953); Miller Lumber Co. v. Federal Home Develo~ 3l 
ment, 231 Wis. 509, 286 N.W. 58, 122 A.L.R. n 8-
(1939). The Maryland Court of Appeals in the Du E 
trict Heights Apartments case stated the principle till n 
way: w 
[A lien claimant] cannot thereafter exten: 
the time within which the lien may be filed b t' 
doing or furnishing small additional items am 11 
thereby fixing a date from which the period mru al 
begin to run anew, especially where the doin! w 
or furnishing of such items is merely colorablt e 
and the real intention is to save or restore: w 
right which is already imperiled or lost, or wher1 . 
the additional work is done or additional ma SJ 
te,rials are furnished without the knowledgt T 
request or consent of the owner. District H eighl er 
Apartments v. Noland Co., Ibid. K 
Under a Delaware statute a Delaware court ha1 
held that the fact that a contract had not been fulh ff 
performed at the time of its wrongful termination b! Iii 
the owner who had received the labor and material· I: 
would not validate a lien-claim filed more than tht p 
90 days after the last labor was performed or the fas! oJ 
materials were furnished. Voigtman v. Wilmingtoi n 
8 
fr Trust Bldg., Corp., 7 Penn. (Del.) 265, 78 Atl. 920 
ht ( 1908) . The trial court in the instant case, however, 
gt was not dealing with a wrongful termination of contract 
n! by the owner but a rejection of a contract perform-
ance which, as it held, was "unworkmanlike, unskillful 
Vt and careless" and which did in fact cause actual damage 
3! to Respondent's residence. (R. 24; Tr. p. 18, lines 24-
o~ 30; p. 19, lines 1-11; p. '1-3, lines 14-30; p. 27, lines 
ij: 8-16; p. 44, lines 1-8; p. 48, lines 23-28; and p. 55-58) 
)u Even Appellant's chief witness, DA YID A. NABOR, 
;bi Yerified that Respondent's earliest complaint was "un-
workmanlike" performance. (Tr. p. 156, lines 7-15) 
~n' Although there is some division among the authori-
b ties as to the exact time of abandonment, Respondent's 
illl 
w absolute rejection of the contract and Appellant's un-
;Il! workmanlike performance of said contract reasonably 
bit establish the lime of abandonment as the date on which 
~: work ceased, the "Stop vVork" order issued, and Re-
er1 
13 spondent ordered Appellant's workmen off his premises. 
gt That day was May 7, 1966, not May 24, 1966. Cf. Chi-
hi cago Lumber Co. v. Merrirnack River Sav. Bank, 52 
Kan. 410, 34 P. 1045 (1893). 
131 
The burden of demonstrating that a lien has been 
lh filed within the statutory 80-day period rests on the 
b! lien claimant, Nagle v. Club Fontainbleau, 17 Utah 2d 
~ . 
125, 405 P .2d 346 ( 1965), who must substantially com-
ht ply with all requirements of the statute in the statement 
11! 
of his claim, and in all essential particulars such state-
oi JUent must be true. Morrison, Merrill Co. v. Willard, 
9 
17 Utah 306, 53 P. 832 ( 1898). If the claimant fat 
i·o file his lien within 80 days of the last substantial wor l! 
done on the premises, his claim of a lien is invalii er 
N ar;le ·~'. Club Jllrmtainbleau, Ibid. rt 
Appellant in the instant case failed to satisfy tfi w 
Trial Court ti1ilt its lien was filed timely. Its own wii cc 
nesses clearly estabfahed .May 6 or 7, i966, as the ver 01 
last day any "substantial" work was done on the "pren st 
ises" of the Respondent. Consequently, a lien filed o -
August 10, 1966, was either 95 or 96 days after an, T 
substantial work \Vas done on Respondent's premise cc 
Equally fatal to the validity of Appellant's claim 1 a~ 
lien was the falsity of the claim itself which allegB ( 
~h(1t Ap~jellant had furnished the "last labor and rn• tc 
iL.rials on the 24th day of May, 1966." (R. 16) Tl1 tc 
only thing accomplished by Appellant on said late dai 
was the delinquent purchase of a building permit. tl 
There was, therefore, no error committed by tf1 ff 
Trial Court in finding that the Appellant's Notice " f < 
lien filed August 10, 1966, was invalid and did wroni w 
fully misrepresent the date on which the last labor an Y 
materials were furnished by Appellant. 
POINT II 
(' 
sl 
tc 
lJ 
THE DA::\IAGES FOUND RY THE TRIAi 1i 
COURT AGAINST THE DEFENDANT ANI 
APPELLANT ARE SUBSTANTIATED B1 
TI-IE E \TIDENCE AND ARE NOT EXCES a: 
d 
SIYE. 
10 
fat Under Section 38-1-18, Utah Code Annotated, 
vor 1953, the successful party in any action brought to 
alii enforce a mechanic's lien "shall be entitled to recover a 
reasonable attorney's fee, to be fixed by the court, 
. tfi which shall be taxed as costs in this action." Appellant's 
.. counterclaim (R. 5) was in fact an action to enforce 
WI' 
or foreclose a mechanic's lien. Respondent, being the ver 
c·en successful party in said action, was entitled therefore 
l 
0 
--as a matter of law-to a reasonable attorneys' fee. 
The original complaint of Respondent prayed for both 
an 
costs of the action and "such other and further relief 
!St 
as to the court may seem proper in the premises." 
111 
~g6 (R. 2) This statutory allowance of attorneys' fees 
to the successful party in such an action should extend 
Ill• 
Tli to an appeal as well as the trial stage of the action. 
:lai Counsel for Appellant submitted to the Trial Court 
that the Utah State Bar Fee Schedule could be followed 
tf1 in assessing attorney fees. His submission was in the 
; " following language: "If there are attorney fees either 
mi way, we'll submit that the bar schedule is subject to 
an Your Honor's inspection." (Tr. p. 158, lines 1-3) 
Counsel for Respondent joined in that submission. It 
should be noted that the $250.00 attorneys' fee awarded 
to Respondent is less than allowed under the Utah State 
Har Fee Schedule for an action to foreclose a $3,290.00 
Al lien. 
\TI 
B1 The general damages in the sum of $627.00 were 
~S assessed as compensation to restore Respondent's resi-
dence to its condition prior to Appellant's breaking 
11 
the bricks all around Respondent's residence. Th. cc 
damage was described at the trial by Respondeni fr 
the Utah State Building Inspector and one of Appel $( 
lant' s own workmen. (Tr. p. 8, lines 17-30; p. 9 an'. th 
10; p. 19, lines 1-8; p. 55-57; p. 69, lines 26-30; p. 711 JJl 
lines 1-6; p. 127, lines 8-16; and Plaintiff's Exhi\1 
L and JH) The Trial Court found that this damao ~ of 
was caused by the "umvorkmanlike, unskillful an p 
careless manner" in which Appellant's workmen a1 
re 
tempted to apply siding to Respondent's residenct 
( R. 24) To this finding the Appellant has taken 1: 
exception. 
Appellant did object to the admission of Plaintil! 
Exhibits L and M as being heresay. (Tr. p. 67, lim 
8-12) Respondent did, however, testify on cross exam 
nation that he was present when one bid (Exhibit ~l 
was handwritten and the other (Exhibit L) sig1m 
Apparently the Trial Court followed the detailed est 
mate of repair costs enumerated in Plaintiff's Exhili 
M (Tr. p. 68, lines 20-30) as a partial guide to ti 
amount of compensation for the substantial damag 
to Respondent's residence. :MR . .T. F. FERRIN te1i 
fied, with no objection from Appellant, that he hR 
submitted a bid of $2,100.00 to re-cover the damagt 
home of Respondent with wood grain siding inclwliL. 
the placing of firring strips only 16 inches apart al' 
heavier backers behind the siding. (Tr. p. 41, linr 
2-30 and p. 42, lines 1-24) 
It is submitted that the Trial Court had sufficiei 
12 
l'h. competent evidence from the foregoing cited excerpts 
eni from the Transcript to assess the damages at only 
pe: $627.00. The Trial Court also made judicial note of 
an. the fact that the bids had been submitted by "reputable 
711 individuals in town." (Tr. p. 68, lines 2-3) 
11il1 
In answer to Appellant's objection to the award 
iai of $1,000.00 as exemplary damages to Respondent-
an Plaintiff, the following factors in this case should be 
a1 
l 1: 
till 
Jim 
am 
~j 
'lltl 
I 
est 
hili 
I ti 
linr 
cie1 
recalled: 
1. Appellant induced Respondent to contract by 
promises of an "A No. l" job to be shown on 
television. (Tr. p. 4, lines 25-30; and p. 34, lines 
11-15) 
2. The contract was a form prepared by Appellant 
and which by its printed terms unilaterally 
favored and protected the Appellant. ( R. 18) 
3. The work done by Appellant was unworkman-
like, unskillful and careless and caused great 
damage to Respondent's residence. (R. 24) 
4. Appellant avoided official detection of this in-
ferior workmanship by willfully failing and 
ref using to obtain a building permit with its 
attendant inspection requirements by qualified 
city inspectors. (Tr. p. 47, lines 13-19; p. 53, 
lines 24-30; and p. 54, line 1) 
5. In spite of Respondent's repeated objections to 
the quality of Appellant's work (Tr. p. 6, lines 
13-28 and p. 7, lines 15-19) Appellant's rep-
13 
resentatives threatened to sue Respondent if lht Ai 
(Appellant's workmen) couldn't finish the wor; ap 
(Tr. p. 35, lines 19-21) 
WI 
6. Appellant filed a Notice of Lien against R1 de 
spondent's residence on August 10, 1965, i P1 
days after being ordered off the premises by tl ( 1 
Respondent on May 7, 1966, and 96 days aft1 
their work had been officially stopped by tf 
Ogden City Building Inspector on l\lay 6, 19ti1 w 
ar 
7. The purported lien of Appellant falsely state er 
that the Appellant "did furnish the last labi p 
and materials on the 24th day of May, 1960 di 
(R. 16) re 
8. The lien recording was published to commerci: w 
and professional establishments in the Ogdt m 
area by means of the "What's What" publicatio: cc 
causing naturally great embarrassment to R1 a 
spondent and his family. (Tr. p. 13, lines 18-2: A 
tt 
Exemplary damages may be allowed as a punisi 
l· 
ment to a def en<lant as a warning and example to deh 
him and others from committing like offenses in ti 
future. 22 Am. Jur. 2d Damages §237 (1965). Th a 
court has held that for a defendant to become liable f1 p 
exemplary damages he must know that his act is wrolli \\ 
ful and do it intentionally without just cause or excus 
and if he acts in good faith, with honest belief that 11 
act is lawful, he is not liable for such damages, thou; s 
mistaken as to legality of the act. Calhoun v. Univen d 
Credit Co., 106 Utah 166, 14<6 P.2d 284, 288 ( 1941 ( 
14 
it Aud further, that the assessment of such damages must 
,r; appear to have some basis in reason in relation to the 
wrongful act, the manner and intent with which it was 
R1 done, the injury inflicted and th actual damage suffered. 
Powers v. Taylor, 14 Utah 2d 152, 379 P.2d 380, 383 
tl ( 1963). 
1~ Appellant argues that there was no allegation of 
willful misconduct or malice on the part of defendant 
ltii 
and that there was nothing in the evidence to show 
te either. To the contrary, the complaint of Respondent-
bi Plaintiff specifically prayed for $5,000.00 as exemplary 
JO damages and the foregoing eight factors supported by 
references to the Record and Transcript are replete 
c1: with evidence of willful and wrongful misconduct com-
dt mitted intentionally without just cause or excuse. The 
io: contract in the instant case was solicited by means of 
R1 a sales commission in the sum of $800.00, about which 
2: Appellant's off ice manager had a most difficult time 
isi telling the truth. (Tr. p. 146, lines 8-30 and p. H7, lines 
1-20) 
eh 
Although the contract itself provided in bold print 
rh a guaranty against faulty work or faulty materials, it 
f1 proved in fact to be merely illusory and a thing about 
mi which Appelant refused discussion with Respondent. 
u~ (Tr. p. 6, liens 12-19; p. 154, lines 24-30; p. 155; and p. 
1:36. lines 1-15) It was Appellant's horirble workman-
u; ship that caused the severe damage to Respondent's resi-
·n dcnce, which was, incidentally, a finding of the Trial 
Jl Court to 'vhich the Appellant has taken no exception. 
15 
CONCLUSION 
It is submitted that the Trial Court committed 
error in finding the purported lien of the defenda 
to be invalid and that the damages, both general a: 
exemplary, awarded to Respondent were reasonal 
and supported by the evidence. As a matter of h 
Respondent was entitled to a reasonable attorneys' f 
as a direct consequence of Appellant's countercla, 
to foreclose a mechanic's lien. The judgment of !1 
Trial Court should be sustained and Respondent awar 
ed its costs. 
Respect£ ully submitted, 
FROERER, HOROWITZ, PARKER, 
RICHARDS, THORNLEY & CRITCHLO\ 
BY: 'VILLIAM J. CRITCHLOW, III 
200 Kiesel Building 
Ogden, Utah 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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